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Abstract 
 
Bereavement can be a precipitating and perpetuating factor for 
various psychiatric injuries. However, the normal experience of 
bereavement also causes significant disruption and stress in an 
individual's psychosocial functioning. Both in the Netherlands 
and in South Africa, a clear distinction is drawn between 
sadness and psychiatric injury. Dutch law until recently did not  
make provision for compensation for sadness, but only for 
psychiatric injury. This has changed with the coming into 
operation of the Wet Affectieschade on 1 January 2019. In terms 
of South African law, there is no claim for compensation for 
sadness or bereavement. The authors are of the opinion that  
bereavement, sadness or grief resulting from bereavement 
causes significant distress and a continuum exists between 
normal and complex bereavement where a clear distinction does 
not exist. South African courts should, therefore, bear this is 
mind in actions for compensation for non-patrimonial loss for 
bereavement. 
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1 Introduction 
In the Netherlands the courts have for many decades drawn a distinction 
between two types of non-patrimonial loss, namely shockschade, for which 
compensation could be claimed in terms of article 6:106 of the Burgelijk 
Wetboek,1 and affectieschade, which was not actionable.2 Shockschade 
involves more than sadness. It involves some kind of psychiatric injury, 
whereas affectieschade, on the other hand, entails feelings of sadness but 
no psychiatric injury.3 In the absence of the latter, even if the feelings of 
sadness are severe and the victim cannot cope, this type of damage was 
not actionable.4 The decisions of the Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court of 
Appeal) in the Jeffrey5 and Baby Joost6 cases, in which the parents were 
denied compensation for non-patrimonial loss for affectieschade, started 
the long process towards amending the legal position to allow for 
compensation for this type of loss.7 Lindenbergh describes this as the 
biggest change in the law of damages since the New Civil Code came into 
operation.8 
The Dutch Senate (Eerste Kamer) recently approved legislation making 
provision for compensating affectieschade subject to certain conditions.9 
The legislation came into operation on 1 January 2019.10 The amendment 
affects not only the Civil Code, but also the Penal Code. This article is 
concerned with the amendments to the Civil Code only. 
                                                 
** André Mukheibir. B Mus BJuris LLB (UPE) HDE BA Hons (Unisa) DIur (Amsterdam).  
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1  Dutch Civil Code. 
2  Taxibus arrest HR 22 Februari 2002, NJ 2002, 240 m.nt. JBM para 5.2 (hereafter the 
Taxibus case). 
3  Taxibus case para 5.2. 
4  Taxibus case para 5.2. 
5  Jeffrey HR 9 October 1998, NJ 1998, 853. 
6  Baby Joost HR 8 September 2000, NJ 2000, 734 (hereafter the Baby Joost case). 
7  See below 2.2.1. 
8  Lindenbergh 2018 TPR 1377. 
9  Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2015 https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/  
34257_vergoeding_van; Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid 2018 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2018-132.html. 
10  Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2018 https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/ 
20181009/publicatie_inwerkingtreding/document3/f=/vksf2ut09hzj.pdf; Ministerie van 
Justitie en Veiligheid 2018 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2018-
132.html. 
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In South Africa the courts do not award compensation for grief. In order to 
claim compensation for "emotional shock", some kind of psychiatric harm is 
required.11 This was confirmed recently in the very tragic case of Michael 
Komape, who died when he fell into a pit toilet at school.12 In that case the 
court, in following precedent, held that the claim for compensation for grief 
could not be allowed.13 In the Life Esidimeni arbitration award, on the other 
hand, compensation was awarded to the bereaved family members of the 
victims, with former Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke decrying the 
inadequacy of the common law remedy.14 
This article will show that the line between bereavement and conditions 
such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is not always very clear and that 
there is a continuum of psychological and emotional conditions that could 
potentially arise from a traumatic event. The distinction between 
shockschade and affectieschade or, in South African parlance, mere 
sadness and psychiatric injury, is somewhat simplistic, and the courts 
should take each case on its facts rather than making a hard and fast rule.  
The fear of the so-called "floodgates opening" has been a perennial problem 
in both the jurisdictions under discussion, however, the plaintiff ultimately 
has to prove harm, and once the harm has been proven, the "floodgate" 
problem can be averted by means of the application of the general principles 
of delict, in particular that of legal causation. The principles of delict, are, 
however, also infused with the values of the Constitution,15 such as equality 
and dignity, and any limitation of delictual liability on the part of defendants 
will take place within the ambit of the constitutional imperative to develop 
the Common Law.16 
The monetary costs of the psychiatric treatment, being patrimonial loss, are 
recovered by means of the actio legis Aquiliae. This does not form part of 
                                                 
11  Barnard v SANTAM Bpk  1999 1 SA 202 (SCA) (hereafter the Barnard case); Bester v 
Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk  1973 1 SA 769 (A) 
(hereafter the Bester case). See, however, Mbhele v MEC for Health for the Gauteng 
Province 2016 ZASCA 166 (18 November 2016), where the court did not allude to the 
difference between grief and psychological injury. 
12  Komape v Minister of Basic Education 2018 ZALMPPHC 18 (23 April 2018) (hereafter 
the Komape case). 
13  Komape case. 
14  In the Arbitration between: Families of Mental Health Care Users Affected by the 
Gauteng Mental Marathon Project and National Minister of Health of the Republic of 
South Africa, Government of the Province of Gauteng, Premier of the Province of 
Gauteng and MEC of Health, Province of Gauteng (19 March 2018) (hereafter the Life 
Esidimeni case). 
15  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,  1996. 
16  Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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the discussion below. Instead, this note is concerned with non-patrimonial 
loss claimed in terms of the Germanic action for pain and suffering. 
2 Dutch law 
Dutch law recognises a clear dividing line between psychiatric injury 
(shockschade) and sadness (affectieschade). As mentioned in the 
introduction, until recently the courts did not award compensation for the 
latter. Commencing in 2003, a long process ensued to change the law in 
order to provide some relief (fixed amounts) for a clearly identified group of 
people. Below follows an exposition of the legal position prior to the 
amendment of the Civil Code, followed by an explanation of the relevant 
sections of the amended Civil Code. 
2.1 The position before the amendment of the law 
2.1.1 The provisions of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) 
Part 10 of Book 6, Title 1 of the Civil Code governs the awarding of all 
damages, including compensation, for non-patrimonial loss. This part is 
entitled "Legal Obligations for Damages".17 Article 95 provides that damage 
that can be compensated in terms of the law consists of patrimonial loss 
("vermogensschade") and other loss ("ander nadeel").18 The term "ander 
nadeel" implies loss that is not patrimonial. Not all non-patrimonial loss is 
compensable; only insofar as the law gives a right to compensation for this 
loss ("voor zover de wet op vergoeding hiervan recht geef").19 
Article 6:106 governs liability for non-patrimonial loss. Sub-section 1 lists 
the various instances in which a victim would be entitled to compensation:20 
                                                 
17  Wettelijike verplichting tot schadevergoeding. 
18  The original Dutch reads as follows: "De schade die op grond van een wettelijke 
verplichting tot schadevergoeding moet worden vergoed, bestaat in 
vermogensschade en ander nadeel, dit laatste voor zover de wet op vergoeding 
hiervan recht geeft". 
19  Article 95 of the Dutch Civil Code. 
20  The original Dutch reads as follows: "Voor nadeel dat niet in vermogensschade 
bestaat, heeft de benadeelde recht op een naar billijkheid vast te stellen 
schadevergoeding: (a) indien de aansprakelijke persoon het oogmerk had zodanig 
nadeel toe te brengen; (b) indien de benadeelde lichamelijk letsel heeft opgelopen, in 
zijn eer of goede naam is geschaad of op andere wijze in zijn persoon is aangetast;  
(c) indien het nadeel gelegen is in aantasting van de nagedachtenis van een 
overledene en toegebracht is aan de niet van tafel en bed gescheiden echtgenoot, de 
geregistreerde partner of een bloedverwant tot in de tweede graad van de overledene,  
mits de aantasting plaatsvond op een wijze die de overledene, ware hij nog in leven 
A MUKHEIBIR & G MITCHELL  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  5 
a) where the perpetrator had the intention (the Dutch word used is 
"oogmerk") to cause the damage; 
b) where the victim suffered physical injury, or his honour or good name 
was damaged, or he suffered personal harm in any way; or 
c) where there is damage to the memory of a person who has passed 
away. In this case, a number of people are mentioned, namely a 
spouse from whom the victim was not separated, the registered 
partner of the victim or any blood relation up to the second degree of 
the deceased. The proviso here is that the deceased, had he been 
alive, would have had a claim for damage to his honour or good name. 
It would appear that where there is intention on the part of the perpetrator, 
it does not matter for what type of damage compensation can be claimed. It 
is not clear whether damages claimed in terms of subsection (a) would 
include compensation for affectieschade, which was not compensable prior 
to 1 January 2019. 
2.1.2 "Ander nadeel" – The difference between shockschade and 
affectieshade 
Article 6:106 makes provision for the recovery of non-patrimonial loss, 
including loss for emotional shock. The courts have drawn a distinction 
between shockshade and affectieschade.21 
Shockschade entails an injury to the plaintiff as a result of a confrontation 
with an injury to, or the death of a loved one.22 The injury suffered by the 
plaintiff goes beyond feelings of sadness. In order to have a claim for 
shockschade, the plaintiff has to suffer some kind of psychiatric harm; 
(referred to by Verheij23 as "een in de psychiatrie erkend ziektebeeld") for 
example, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. 
Affectieschade, on the other hand, entails damage which is a consequence 
derived from the death or injury of another, where that other person is the 
victim of wrongful conduct, but where the plaintiff nevertheless suffers 
feelings of sadness.24 At the time of the drafting of article 6:106, the drafters 
                                                 
geweest, recht zou hebben gegeven op schadevergoeding wegens het schaden van 
zijn eer of goede naam." 
21  See for example Taxibus para 5.2. 
22  Verheij Vergoeding van Immateriële Schade 115. 
23  Verheij Vergoeding van Immateriële Schade 115. 
24  See the Jeffrey case and the Baby Joost case discussed below. 
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were of the opinion that recognising affectieschade as compensable would 
have adverse consequences; for example, compensation could result in the 
"commercialisation" of sorrow and result in a situation where, for example, 
a widow has to maintain the level of her sadness and not enter into a new 
relationship.25  
Two decisions of the Hoge Raad led to the legislative process in terms of 
which affectieschade would become actionable.26 The first of these is the 
Jeffrey27 case.28 On 14 November 1990, as on several previous occasions, 
the parents of a little boy named Jeffrey took him for a swimming lesson at 
a swimming pool belonging to the Free University in Amsterdam. Jeffrey 
suffered from motion problems and the swimming lessons, under the 
supervision of a swimming therapist, were part of his therapy. His mother 
was also present. During the lesson, the therapist lowered the bottom of the 
pool, thus increasing the depth thereof. After the lesson, Jeffrey and his 
mother went to shower, each taking a shower in a separate area. The 
therapist, after having gone to the staff cloakroom to get changed, noticed 
that one of the shower doors was open and the shower was running. She 
found Jeffrey's mother in the other shower and they went to look for him. 
Upon arriving at the pool, they found Jeffrey in the pool, under the water. 
He was taken from the water and rushed to hospital where he was 
resuscitated, however, he had suffered severe brain damage and died some 
days later. 
The parents approached the court for relief against the society that 
managed the swimming pool.29 They claimed a declaration of rights in 
stating that the Society was liable for the death of the child and damages. 
This declaration was a prerequisite to their damages claim. The court a quo 
and the Hoge Raad rejected both claims. It was held that they had not 
shown "voldoende belang" or a clear interest to hold the society liable. While 
they had shown an emotional interest, it was not of sufficient legal 
relevance.  
                                                 
25  The legislative process from 2000 to 2011 is described in detail by Essen Vergoeding 
van Immateriële Schade 39-61. 
26  Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2002-2003 https://www.recht.nl/doc/kst28781-
3.pdf 4. Also see Juridisch Bureau Letselschade en Gezondheidsrecht 2015 
https://www.juridischbureauletselschade.nl/de-ontwikkeling-van-het-wetsvoorstel-
omtrent-affectieschade/. 
27  Jeffrey case 853. 
28  Jeffrey case 853. 
29  A society known as the Vereniging voor Christelijk  Wetenschappelijk  Onderwijs. 
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The second case was that of Baby Joost.30 In this instance, the parents of 
a boy called Joost sued a medical practitioner and the hospital for damages. 
When Joost was four years old he had to undergo surgery to have a hernia 
corrected. During the course of the operation he suffered brain damage, as 
a result of which he was severely handicapped, physically and mentally. His 
parents claimed compensation under various heads of damages, inter alia, 
the need to modify the home and to purchase a modified vehicle to 
accommodate the handicapped child. They also claimed compensation for 
non-patrimonial loss. This claim was allowed although reduced by the court 
of the first instance, but both the court of appeal and the Hoge Raad rejected 
the claim for non-patrimonial loss on the basis that no wrongfulness could 
be established vis-à-vis the parents. Mere sadness would not suffice as a 
basis for compensation. 
In the Taxibus case,31 the Hoge Raad drew a distinction between non-
patrimonial loss which was compensable and that which was not. In this 
case a mother, as she was exiting her house, saw her daughter lying in the 
driveway. She had been run over by a so-called taxibus and her skull had 
been cracked open. The mother called an ambulance and went to turn her 
child over onto her back. In the process of the mother’s turning the child 
over, the mother's hand inadvertently entered the child's skull. Not only did 
the mother experience deep sadness as a result of the child's death, but 
she also presented with serious depression and Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder as a result of this experience. The court of the first instance 
rejected the claim for compensation for sadness.32 
Both the court of appeal33 and the Hoge Raad34 allowed the claim for non-
patrimonial loss insofar as it related to her psychiatric harm (shockschade). 
The claim for affectieschade was rejected.35 The mother contested the 
differentiation between shockschade and affectieschade, which had been 
made by the court. The Hoge Raad dismissed the cross appeal by the 
mother questioning the distinction between the two types of non-patrimonial 
loss, stating that Dutch Law had never made provision for compensation for 
feelings of sadness.36 
                                                 
30  Baby Joost case 734. 
31  Taxibus case. 
32  Taxibus case para 1. 
33  Taxibus case para 3.3(i).  
34  Taxibus case para 5.4. 
35  Taxibus case paras 3.3(j) and 5.3. 
36  Taxibus case para 5.4. 
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2.2 Compensation for sadness – The legal position after 1 January 
2019 
2.2.1 The legislative journey37 
The journey toward the recognition of affectieschade as a ground for 
damages has been a long one, commencing in 2000 in the aftermath of the 
decisions in the Jeffrey and Baby Joost cases.38 From the report of the 
Attorney General39 on the facts of the Jeffrey case, it is clear that the 
legislature at the time of the drafting of Article 6:106 never intended for 
affectieschade to be compensable. Some of the arguments against 
compensating this loss considered by the drafters included the following: 
a) compensation could result in a commercialisation of sadness and lead 
to situations where, for example, a widow would have to maintain a 
certain level of sadness and not commence a new relationship; 
b) the possibility of odious practices where a defendant could dispute the 
closeness of the relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff; 
and 
c) defining the "kring van de gerechtigen" or parties entitled to 
affectieschade could be problematic for a judge. 
The process towards the new legislation commenced in 2000, when a 
member of the Tweede Kamer (the Dutch lower house) posed certain 
questions to the then Minister of Justice, AP Korthals.40 This was followed 
a few months later by a motion to amend the Civil Code to allow for the 
compensation of affectieschade. The legislature was faced with the choice 
of amending the Civil Code to make provision for affectieschade, or to leave 
it to the courts.41 The latter option was not ideal because that would place a 
judge in the position of having to interpret the law contra legem (that is, a 
situation of a hard case making bad law) in order to accommodate the 
                                                 
37  The legislative process from 2000 to 2011 is described in detail by Essen Vergoeding 
van Immateriële Schade. 
38  Nederlands Juristenblad 2003 https://www.njb.nl/wetgeving/wetsvoorstel len/  
affectieschade.5743.lynkx. 
39  In cases decided by the Hoge Raad, the Attorney-General may write a detailed legal 
opinion that is added as an addendum to the judgment. The court has a choice as to 
whether or not to follow this opinion. See Hoge Raad Der Nederlanden 2018 
https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad-der-
Nederlanden/Over-de-Hoge-Raad. 
40  Tweede Kamer Aanhangsel Handelingen 2000/2001, Nr 105. See Lindenbergh 2010 
Nederlands Juristenblad 1530-1532 for an overview of the process. 
41  Essen Vergoeding van Immateriële Schade 59. 
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claimant.42 This could lead to legal uncertainty, both in the case of liability 
insurers and victims.43 
Over the next few years, the matter was debated and draft legislation was 
presented to the Tweede Kamer, debated and further amended and later 
approved, in March 2005.44 In terms of the draft legislation certain parties 
could receive compensation in the amount of €10 000. The fixing of the 
amount is regarded by Hartlief45 as the "Achilles heel" of the legislation, 
because it treats everyone the same, irrespective of the seriousness of the 
harm. 
The draft legislation was referred thereafter to the Eerste Kamer, where it 
was debated again. Many questions were raised, particularly in connection 
with the fixed amount of compensation for which the draft legislation made 
provision. In a plenary session held in 2006, questions were raised as to 
whether affectieschade should be compensated. The Minister of Justice had 
ordered in the interim that an investigation be undertaken.  
Throughout the process, there was an underlying fear of an increase in 
litigiousness ("Amerikaanse toestanden"; "claimcultuur"),46 which 
permeated the debates.47 As a result, the legislative process was put on 
ice48 and in 2010 the Eerste Kamer voted against the draft legislation.49  
The process towards compensating affectieschade started afresh in 2015 
when new draft legislation was submitted to the legislature.50 The new draft 
legislation had a broader ambit; making provision for different amounts of 
compensation, depending on various factors (see below). The list of 
potential claimants was also expanded. The draft legislation was passed by 
                                                 
42  Also see Hartlief Leven in Een Claimcultuur 13. 
43  Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2002-2003 https://www.recht.nl/doc/kst28781-
3.pdf 4. Also see Juridisch Bureau Letselschade en Gezondheidsrecht 2015 
https://www.juridischbureauletselschade.nl/de-ontwikkeling-van-het-wetsvoorstel-
omtrent-affectieschade/. 
44  Also see Hartlief Leven in Een Claimcultuur 13. 
45  Hartlief Leven in Een Claimcultuur 13. 
46  Also see Hartlief Leven in Een Claimcultuur 1, 2, 14. 
47  Tweede Kamer 20 April 2017 TK 71; Eerste Kamer Stemming 23 March 2010. Also 
see Hartlief Leven in Een Claimcultuur 12. 
48  Van Wees 2006 Tijdschrift voor Personenschade 12; and further De Jong 2012 
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=128492. 
49  Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2005 https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/  
20051011/korte_aantekening_3/document3/ f=/vj45mdfxsyi0.pdf. Also see De Jong 
2012 http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=128492. 
50  Tweede Kamer Vergaderjaar 2014-2015, 34 257, Nr 2. 
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the Tweede Kamer in May 201751 and in April 2018, the Eerste Kamer voted 
in favour thereof.52 
2.2.2 The position from 1 January 2019 
Several changes have been introduced to the Dutch Civil Code to allow for 
the compensation of affectieschade.53 The Wet Affectieschade came into 
operation on 1 January 2019.54 
In terms of the new law, the following are entitled to claim compensation for 
affectieschade:55 
a) a spouse (provided that the spouses are not separated at the time of 
the harm-causing event); 
b) a partner of the victim; 
c) the parents of the victim; 
d) the children of the victim; 
e) someone who, at the time of the accident, in the family context, was 
responsible for caring for the victim; 
f) someone for whom, in the family context, the victim had been caring 
at the time of the accident; or 
g) any person who was in a close enough relationship with the victim 
where the requirements of reasonableness and fairness would require 
that the person was entitled to compensation for affectieschade.56 
The purpose of the legislation, according to Minister Dekker, is to recognise 
the grief of someone whose life has been turned upside down as a result of 
                                                 
51  Tweede Kamer Overzicht van Afdeling Inhoudelijke Ondersteuningstemmingen 9 Mei 
2017. 
52  Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2015 https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/ 
34257_vergoeding_van. 
53  Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid 2018 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/s tb-
2018-132.html. 
54  Rijksoverheid 2018 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2018/04/10/eers te -
kamer-stemt-in-met-vergoeding-van-affectieschade. For a detailed discussion of the 
new legal position see Lindenbergh 2018 TPR 1377-1382. 
55  Article 107(2) of the Dutch Civil Code as amended. 
56  The Dutch text for subsection (g) is quoted here for the sake of clarity. It reads as 
follows: "een andere persoon die in een zodanige nauwe persoonlijke relatie tot de 
gekwetste staat, dat uit de eisen van redelijkheid en billijkheid voortvloeit dat hij voor 
de toepassing van lid 1 onder b als naaste wordt aangemerkt". 
A MUKHEIBIR & G MITCHELL  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  11 
someone else’s mistake.57 While the compensation of affectieschade 
cannot remove the pain of the next of kin of the victim, it does acknowledge 
the pain and provides some solace and closure.58 
The amount that will be awarded to the plaintiff in a successful claim will be 
between between €12500 and €20000.59 Exactly how much a plaintiff will 
receive will depend on the following:60 
 the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim; 
 whether the victim died; and 
 in the case of injury, whether the injury was both serious and 
permanent. 
The Dutch Association of Insurers61 supports the new legislation despite the 
fact that it recognises that a greater burden will be placed on insurance 
companies. The support for the legislation is the result of the fact that there 
are clear guidelines and hence certainty about who would qualify ("vaste 
kring van gerechtigen") and for how much. As a result, the fear of 
"Amerikaanse toestanden" has been addressed. 
3 South African law 
The cases of Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA 
Bpk 62 and Barnard v SANTAM Bpk63 are generally regarded as the leading 
cases insofar as compensation for non-patrimonial loss arising from 
emotional shock is concerned. As will be seen below, these cases and 
others that followed them required some form of psychiatric lesion or 
                                                 
57  Rijksoverheid 2018 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2018/04/10/eers te -
kamer-stemt-in-met-vergoeding-van-affectieschade. Also see Eerste Kamer Nadere 
Memorie van Antwoord Eerste Kamer, Vergaderjaar 2017-2018, 34 257. 
58  Article 107(2)(g) of the Dutch Civil Code. 
59  "Besluit vergoeding affectieschade" Staatsblad van het Koningkryk  der Nederlande  
2018 133. For a table of amounts see Herngreen 2015 
https://www.slotletselschade.nl/wet-affectieschade/. 
60  "Besluit Vergoeding Affectieschade" Staatsblad van het Koningkryk  der Nederlande 
2018 133. 
61 Verbond van Verzekeraars 2018 https://www.verzekeraars.nl/publicat ies  
/actueel/verbond-blij -met-nieuwe-wet-affectieschade. Also see Personenschade 
Instituut van Verzekeraars 2018 https://stichtingpiv.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ 
PIV1809_bulletin-4_WTK_11122018.pdf. 
62  Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk  1973 1 SA 769 (A) 
(hereafter the Bester case). 
63  Barnard v SANTAM Bpk  1999 1 SA 202 (SCA) (hereafter the Barnard case). 
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injury.64 Neetling and Potgieter regard this as a simple application of the 
maxim de minimis non curat lex, that harm which is not reasonably serious 
will not be compensable.65 In the years after these cases were reported, 
other cases were decided that confirmed the principles formulated in the 
Bester and Barnard cases, while there have also been cases that seemed 
to have dispensed with the explicit requirement of psychiatric injury, such 
as Mbhele v MEC for Health for the Gauteng Province.66 
3.1 Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA 
Bpk 
In this case, two brothers aged 11 and 6 were crossing a road. The younger 
boy was hit by an oncoming car and was killed. The elder brother did not 
sustain any physical injuries but presented with serious shock, which 
resulted in an anxiety neurosis. This required psychiatric treatment.  
The court found that there is no reason why our law would not allow an 
action for satisfaction where someone has suffered harm in the form of 
nervous shock as a result of a psychiatric injury that necessitates treatment. 
Where, however, the shock amounted to "negligible emotional shock, which 
does not last long and has no effect on the health of the person", it will not 
be compensable.67  
3.2 Barnard v SANTAM Bpk 
In this instance, the appellant was the mother of a 13-year old son that was 
a passenger in a bus which collided with a car. It was common cause that 
the driver of the car had been negligent. The boy succumbed to his injuries. 
The appellant had been informed of this when the hospital where the boy 
had died called her husband. The appellant instituted an action in terms of 
                                                 
64  Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 362 and the discussion that follows. 
65  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 302. 
66  See below. Also see Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 362; Neethling and Potgieter 
Law of Delict 300-301. 
67  Bester case para H779. The original Afrikaans reads as follows: "Om bostaande redes 
kom ek dus tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar in ons reg geen rede bestaan waarom 
iemand, wat as gevolg van die nalatige handeling van 'n ander, senuskok op 
psigiatriese besering met gevolglike ongesteldheid opgedoen het, nie op 
genoegdoening geregtig is nie, mits die moontlike gevolge van die nalatige handeling 
voorsien sou gewees het deur die redelike persoon wat hom in die plek van die 
onregpleger sou bevind het. Ek verwys hier nie na niksbeduidende emosionele skok 
van kortstondige duur wat op die welsyn van die persoon geen wesenlike uitwerking 
het nie, en ten opsigte waarvan genoegdoening gewoonlik nie verhaalbaar sou wees 
nie." See the discussion in Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 362 and further. 
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the predecessor of the Road Accident Fund Act,68 the Multilateral Motor 
Vehicle Accidents Fund Act.69 The defendant in this instance was an 
insurance company, one of the "appointed agents" in terms of the Act. The 
plaintiff claimed compensation on the basis that she had suffered serious 
emotional shock and the effects thereof, as well as a great deal of sadness. 
The court had to answer two legal questions, firstly, whether compensation 
for emotional shock could be claimed if the plaintiff was not a witness to the 
accident and secondly, whether the plaintiff's sadness constituted harm for 
the purposes of a delictual action.70 
Regarding the first question, the court was clear that the fact that a plaintiff 
hears about the accident and does not see it does not necessarily preclude 
a claim for damages. The elements of delict have to be proven and the 
plaintiff has to prove harm in the form of psychiatric injury. 
The court in this instance merely reiterated what had been decided in the 
Bester case. Van Heerden JA held that mere sadness is not enough; the 
plaintiff would have to prove psychiatric injury in order to be successful in a 
claim for compensation.71  
3.3 Road Accident Fund v Sauls72 
In the Sauls case the court had to decide whether to uphold the appeal of 
the Road Accident Fund against a victim who had been awarded 
compensation for emotional shock. In this case the plaintiff had witnessed 
an action in which her fiancé was injured, albeit not seriously. She was 
diagnosed as suffering from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with hardly any 
prognosis of recovery. The court, correctly it is submitted, held that the 
correct approach would be to apply the general principles of delict.73 The 
relationship between the primary and secondary victims will play a role, as 
will the seriousness of the injury of the primary victim; however, these will 
be factors that the court will take into consideration, together with legal 
policy, reasonableness, fairness and justice.74 The court found that the 
plaintiff had proven that she suffered from psychiatric injury and in principle, 
                                                 
68  Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. 
69  Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act  93 of 1989. 
70  Barnard case 208D-E. 
71  See Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 363-364; Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 
301-302. 
72  Road Accident Fund v Sauls 2002 2 SA 55 (SCA) (hereafter the Sauls case). 
73  The Sauls case para 17. 
74  The Sauls case. 
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was entitled to compensation.75 The Road Accident Fund's appeal was 
accordingly dismissed.76 
3.4 Mbhele v MEC for Health for the Gauteng Province77 
Ms Delisile Mbhele sued the MEC for Health of the Gauteng Province, 
claiming damages for emotional shock. The claim was based on the fact 
that after having been transferred from a clinic to the Chris Hani 
Baragwanath Hospital because of an emergency case due to foetal distress, 
she was left waiting. As a result of delays and a series of failures on the part 
of the staff, the baby was stillborn. After the birth, the plaintiff was taken into 
a ward with babies and despite asking to be removed from the ward, she 
was left there for eight hours. She had to identify the baby at the mortuary 
but was so distressed that she fainted. As no one else could identify the 
baby, she was assisted and then compelled to identify the baby. 
The court was satisfied on the basis of the facts that the plaintiff had proven 
emotional shock. After having discussed the condition of the plaintiff 
subsequent to the still birth of her child, the court concluded that:78 
[H]er behaviour months after the death of the baby shows that she had 
difficulty coping and that she still has not recovered completely. For all those 
reasons we are satisfied that a case was made for a claim for emotional shock. 
From the judgment it appears as if no psychological evidence was led and 
the court did not refer to either the Bester or the Barnard cases (the latter is 
mentioned in a footnote in the case). 
3.5 The case of Michael Komape 
In the recent case of Komape,79 the issue of compensation for bereavement 
came before the court. Michael Komape was a five year old boy. He was a 
learner in Grade R at Mahlodumela Lower Primary School at Chibeng 
village near Seshego. He had been in the school for three days when he 
disappeared. The principal called his mother, who was of the opinion that 
he may have gone to the crèche he used to attend. His mother went to the 
school and was informed that the school staff had searched everywhere for 
                                                 
75  The Sauls case para 18. 
76  The Sauls case para 19. 
77  Mbhele v MEC for Health for the Gauteng Province 2016 ZASCA 166 (18 November 
2016) (hereafter the Mbhele case). 
78  The Mbhele case para 11. 
79  Komape v Minister of Basic Education 2018 ZALMPPHC 18 (23 April 2018) (hereafter 
the Komape case). 
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him. His mother then went to the crèche where she was informed by a small 
child that Michael had fallen into a pit toilet. When the mother arrived at the 
toilet, she saw his hand protruding from the pit and fainted. She called for 
help but was told that they had to wait for someone to retrieve the body from 
the pit. Shortly after that, her husband, Michael's father, arrived and saw his 
dead son in the toilet. The body was eventually retrieved from the toilet. The 
post mortem evidence showed that he had drowned.80 
This tragedy happened against the background of a dysfunctional school 
system in the Limpopo province. In particular, the matter of the poor state 
of the toilets had been raised by the organisation that represented the 
plaintiffs.81 The plaintiffs claimed the following:82 
a) compensation for the emotional shock and grief suffered by the 
plaintiffs and their minor children. The basis of this claim was "a 
wrongful and negligent breach of a variety of duties of care toward 
Michael which caused his death"; 
b) the alternative claim was for punitive damages, aimed at the 
punishment for and deterrence of wrongful conduct on the basis that 
Michael's constitutional rights were breached; and 
c) an alternative averment included the fact that the plaintiffs and their 
minor had suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome. 
There are a number of problems regarding the way in which these claims 
were formulated;83 however, these are beyond the scope of this article. 
The plaintiffs could not prove Posttraumatic Stress Syndrome and hence, 
also not the requisite psychiatric injury. In response to the request to 
develop the common law to include damages for grief, the court held that 
                                                 
80  The Komape case paras 17-21. 
81  The Komape case para 24. 
82  The Komape case paras 17-21. 
83  Claim A makes reference to a duty of care owed to the deceased. First of all, South 
African law, unlike English law of negligence, does not work with "duty of care". The 
term "legal duty" is used in the context of wrongful omissions. "Duty of care" is used 
in the context of negligence. Furthermore, the parents cannot claim on a duty owed to 
someone else; their claim has to be based on an infringement of their own rights. In 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) (hereafter the Fose case) 
the Constitutional Court rejected the notion of punitive damages. There are arguments  
that can be made for punitive damages on the basis of the fact that in Fose the 1993 
Constitution applied, which applied vertically, but in this case the plaintiff did not  
explain why the decision in Fose should be overturned. While the court in this case 
did refer to Fose, no mention was made of the punitive damages issue. 
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there is no distinction between grief and other psychiatric harm.84 A claim 
for grief that results in psychiatric injury will be actionable. In the absence of 
psychiatric injury, the claim cannot be upheld.85 The court furthermore held 
that in the absence of proof of psychiatric injury, there could be "bogus and 
an unwarranted proliferation of claims for psychiatric injuries" that could 
result in "limitless claims for every conceivable cause of grief whether 
insignificant without expert psychiatric evidence".86 
In the Taxibus case discussed above, the Hoge Raad held that there is a 
clear distinction between harm in the form of psychiatric injury 
(shockschade), and harm in the form of bereavement or grief, 
(affectieschade) seemingly implying that grief cannot cause psychiatric 
harm. It is submitted that the view adopted in Komape is the better view, 
because it makes provision for the fact that grief can be debilitating in some 
instances, despite its not resulting in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. 
In coming to the decision not to award compensation for the parents' 
sadness, the court in Komape followed the decisions in the Bester87 and 
Barnard cases88 insofar as it held that the plaintiff would have to establish 
some kind of psychiatric harm in order to succeed with a claim for emotional 
shock. 
3.6 Western Cape Department of Social Development v Barley89 
This case tells the story of a five year old girl who died while in the care of 
an early care facility known as Aunty Dawn's, in Pinelands, Cape Town, on 
14 October 2010. The facility was registered as a partial care facility by the 
Western Cape Government. After the child's death the parents sued both 
the person who operated the facility, a Mrs Moore, and the Western Cape 
Government.  
The Western Cape Government appealed the decision of the High Court. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court insofar 
                                                 
84  The Komape case para 39. 
85  The Komape case para 39. 
86  The Komape case para 39. 
87  Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk  1973 1 SA 769 (A).  
88  Barnard v SANTAM Bpk  1999 1 SA 202 (SCA). 
89  Western Cape Department of Social Development v Barley 2019 3 SA 235 (SCA) 
(hereafter the Barley case). 
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as the liability for damages was concerned. The claim against the Provincial 
Government was dismissed.  
The court per Dambuza JA referred to Barnard's case, in terms of which 
proof of psychiatric injury was required for the purposes of a claim for 
emotional shock.90 While the parents claimed that they had suffered 
psychiatric injury in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder and 
depression, they presented no evidence to this effect.91 The High Court, 
referring to the foreseeability of harm in the case of the special relationship 
between a mother and a child, allowed the claim despite the deficiencies of 
the evidence.92 The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the claim as far as Mrs 
Moore was concerned, again despite the fact that no evidence of psychiatric 
injury was presented to the court.93 
3.7 The tragedy of the Life Esidimeni patients 
When the news of the tragic deaths of 118 psychiatric patients who had 
been moved from Life Esidimeni to a number of NGO's became known, it 
led to outrage and horror. The facts are described in a fact sheet on the 
website of the Section 27 organisation.94 The death of these patients has 
been described as "the greatest cause of human rights violation since the 
dawn of our democracy".95 In the introduction to his arbitration award, 
former Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke wrote the following:96 
This is a harrowing account of the death, torture and disappearance of utterly 
vulnerable mental health care users in the care of an admittedly delinquent  
provincial government. It is also a story of the searing and public anguish of 
the families of the affected mental health care users and of the collective shock 
and pain of many other caring people in our land and elsewhere in the world. 
The award not only contained scathing criticism of the suffering, torture and 
deaths of the victims and the resultant trauma inflicted on the families. The 
                                                 
90  The Barley case para 24. 
91  The Barley case para 24. 
92  The Barley case para 24. 
93  The Barley case para 50. 
94 Section 27 2017 http://section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Life-Esidimeni-
Fact-Sheet-1.pdf. 
95  Adv Dirk Groenwald in his opening statement. See, for example Bornman 2017 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/life-esidimeni-the-greatest-cause-of-
human-right-violations-since-democracy-20171009. 
96  The Life Esidimeni case para 1. 
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inadequacy of the common law in addressing the trauma suffered by the 
families was likewise condemned:97 
In effect the Government has invited me to squeeze this pervasive and reeking 
violation of our Constitution and many valuable laws into psychological injury 
and shock for which R180 000 might be the going rate in trial courts under the 
common law. I decline that invitation. 
Judge Moseneke awarded R180 000 per claimant for general damages, but 
on top of that, he awarded a further amount of R1 million for what he referred 
to as "as appropriate relief and compensation for the Government's 
unjustifiable and reckless breaches" of certain sections of the National 
Health Act.98 It would appear that the purpose of this award is that of 
aggravated or even punitive damages, although these terms are not used. 
The fact that the purpose of the latter award is not specified, for example as 
compensation for patrimonial loss, seems to reinforce this idea. 
4  Bereavement as psychiatric injury 
The distinction between "mere sadness or bereavement" and "psychiatric 
injury" is not very clear. Instead of two watertight categories there is a 
continuum of conditions, as will be shown in this section. As bereavement 
is a normal process of human life, the responses to bereavement, including 
sadness, are also part of the normal processes of the experience of living, 
and there are many cultural norms, expectations, rituals, and coping 
mechanisms that are associated with bereavement.99 Intense yearning or 
longing for the deceased, intense sorrow and emotional pain, and 
preoccupation with the deceased or the circumstances of the death are 
expected responses occurring in bereavement. A sequence of responses 
including protest or denial, searching, despair, detachment and the 
reorganisation of life would be expected in most bereaved persons.100 The 
pangs of grief can often come in waves when memories of the deceased 
are triggered through experiences, objects, photographs and other 
reminders.101 
The duration of a normal grieving process would differ from culture to 
culture, but a common observation would be that the expectations of a 
culture may not entirely relate to the internal experience of the bereaved. In 
western cultures, many people would expect the bereaved to be able to 
                                                 
97  The Life Esidimeni case para 218. 
98 National Health Act 61 of 2003; The Life Esidimeni case paras 3, 226. 
99  APA DSM 5 168. 
100  Sadock and Sadock Synopsis of Psychiatry 64. 
101  APA DSM 5 161,194. 
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reengage with normal social and occupational functions after only a few 
weeks and be able to pursue new relationships within the first year. 
However, the internal, psychological and emotional bereavement process 
does not adhere to societal norms, and many sequelae of the bereavement 
remain for much longer. Particularly, in the bereavement process for the 
death of a spouse, the remaining feeling of loneliness is a very common 
lingering experience.102 
To consider the experience of bereavement as a "psychiatric injury", a 
clinician could consider how the individual's experience of bereavement is 
exceptional in its going beyond an expected response to that bereavement. 
When considering the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders, a clinician is 
always called to consider how the observed symptoms are not culturally or 
age appropriate responses, and also to consider how the symptoms cause 
significant distress and functional impairment.103 Some disorders that might 
be triggered or exacerbated by the experience of bereavement include 
certain mood disorders, particularly a Major Depressive Episode and Major 
Depressive Disorder, an anxiety disorder such as Separation Anxiety 
Disorder, and trauma-related disorders such as Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, Acute Stress Disorder, and Other Specified Trauma and Stressor-
Related Disorder (Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder).104 
4.1 Bereavement and mood disorders 
It is possible to see bereavement exacerbating the experience of Major 
Depression (either as an episode, or in the course of a mood disorder such 
as Major Depressive Disorder, or Bipolar I or II). It would also be possible 
to observe bereavement in a person's life as a potential trigger for a Major 
Depressive Episode, but this may give a clinician reason for caution in 
diagnosing a single Major Depressive Episode (MDE) as a symptom of 
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Periods of sadness should not generally 
be diagnosed as MDE unless there is clarity that the experience is, in fact, 
depression.105 The dynamics of depression are different from those of 
sadness or pangs of grief in bereavement, as will be elaborated on 
shortly.106 
Responses to a significant loss (eg bereavement, financial ruin, losses from a 
natural disaster, a serious medical illness or disability) may include feelings of 
                                                 
102  Sadock and Sadock Synopsis of Psychiatry 64. 
103  APA DSM 5 20-21. 
104  APA DSM 5 125-126, 191-194, 271-280, 289. 
105  APA DSM 5 168. 
106  APA DSM 5 125-126. 
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intense sadness, rumination about the loss, insomnia, poor appetite, and 
weight loss noted in Criterion A [of the DSM 5 criteria for a MDE], which may 
resemble a depressive episode. Although such symptoms may be 
understandable or considered appropriate to the loss, the presence of a major 
depressive episode in addition to the normal response to a significant loss 
should also be carefully considered. This decision inevitably requires the 
exercise of clinical judgment based on the individual's history and the cultural 
norms for the expression of distress in the context of loss.  
Certainly, criteria that relate to severity, duration, and clinically significant 
distress or impairment should be met if making a diagnosis of MDE at the 
time of bereavement.107 
The DSM 5 notes distinguishing features that can assist in determining if 
one is observing grief or MDE, stating that in grief, the "predominant affect 
is the feelings of emptiness and loss". This is distinguished from MDE, 
where the predominant affect "is persistent depressed mood and the 
inability to anticipate happiness or pleasure".108 In grief, it would be common 
to continue to be able to experience other emotions, such as humour at the 
memories of the deceased, thankfulness for the life of the deceased, 
enjoyment and comfort when surrounded by loved ones. Also, the self-
esteem of the bereaved is usually intact, whereas a person experiencing 
MDE would commonly experience feelings of "worthlessness and self-
loathing".109 If suicidal thoughts are present, grief would see these thoughts 
as arising from wanting to join the deceased, whereas in MDE, suicidal 
thoughts would revolve around one's own worthlessness, being 
undeserving of life, or being unable to cope with the psychological pain of 
depression.110 Grief is often stimulus-bound and quite fluid in its 
progression, whereas depression is experienced as more constant and 
pervasive.111  
When working with a bereaved person who would be expected to display 
intense sadness, a clinician would remain aware that the bereavement may 
not be the only life experience causing distress in the person's life. The 
bereaved may have a pre-bereavement diagnosis or predisposition to a 
mood disorder, or depression in particular. The DSM notes that:112  
… when [bereavement and an episode of MDD] do occur together, the 
depressive symptoms and functional impairment tend to be more severe and 
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111  Sadock and Sadock Synopsis of Psychiatry 64. 
112  APA DSM 5 155. 
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the prognosis is worse compared with bereavement that is not accompanied 
by Major Depressive Disorder [and that] bereavement-related depression 
tends to occur in persons with other vulnerabilities to depressive disorders,  
and recovery may be facilitated by antidepressant treatment.  
4.2  Bereavement in children and separation anxiety disorder 
As Separation Anxiety Disorder is most prevalent in children under the age 
of 12,113 it is important to consider this in the context of bereavement in 
children. In children, "grief reactions are coloured by developmental levels 
and concepts of death and may not resemble adult reactions".114 
Bereavement responses are quite varied and manifest in different 
behaviours that reflect their underlying experience of the bereavement. 
Misbehaviour, and behaviours such as throwing themselves into activities, 
may reflect a feeling of abandonment by the loved one and mistrust of others 
who may abandon them in the future. Feelings of self-blame for the death 
are also common.115 The determination between normal bereavement 
responses and more clinically significant or severe sequelae would need 
careful clinical judgment.  
A psychiatric condition that may possibly occur in bereaved children is 
Separation Anxiety Disorder (SAD). This is an excessive fear or anxiety 
concerning separation from home or attachment figures. This "often 
develops after life stress, especially a loss", for example the death of a 
relative. It is distinguished from normal bereavement in that:116  
… intense yearning or longing for the deceased, intense sorrow and emotional 
pain, and preoccupation with the deceased or the circumstances of the death 
are expected responses occurring in bereavement, whereas fear of separation 
from other attachment figures is central in separation anxiety disorder.  
4.3  Bereavement and posttraumatic stress disorder 
Bereavement could lead to the onset of Acute Stress Disorder or 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), if the death of the person happened 
in a way that could be considered a trauma to the bereaved, either by way 
of experiencing a traumatic incident alongside the deceased, witnessing, or 
learning about the traumatic incident in which the person died. This would 
obviously be a very specific set of circumstances. The DSM 5 notes that if 
the traumatic event precipitating PTSD is an actual or threatened death of 
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a loved one, "the event(s) must have been violent or accidental".117 In violent 
and unnatural deaths, grief responses are intermingled with anxiety, 
feelings of victimisation and violation, fear, horror and vulnerability, and a 
"disintegration of cognitive assumptions ensues"; the grief responses may 
be more intense and prolonged than for natural deaths.118 
4.4 Complicated bereavement and persistent complex bereavement 
disorder 
Having considered the possibility of bereavement as a precipitating or 
perpetuating factor for specific psychiatric injuries, the present authors will 
now consider bereavement itself as a significant disruptive factor in an 
individual's psychosocial wellbeing, their social and occupational 
functioning. This will begin to unpack the idea of the existence of a 
continuum between ordinary sadness arising from bereavement, and 
specific psychiatric injuries that can be triggered or exacerbated by 
bereavement.  
Duffy and Wildnote that:119 
[W]hilst there has been understandable caution against over-patholigis ing 
normal grief responses, there is increasing evidence that prolonged grief is 
associated with marked functional impairment, has distinct characteristics 
from bereavement-related depression and anxiety, and has been validated 
across different cultures, age groups and types of bereavement. 
Currently the DSM 5 includes in presentations of "Other Specified Trauma- 
and Stressor-Related Disorder" a designation of "Persistent Complex 
Bereavement Disorder", noting that "this disorder is characterised by severe 
and persistent grief and mourning reactions".120 This would be similar to the 
new disorder, Prolonged Grief Disorder (PGD) that will be included in the 
11th edition of the International Classification and Diseases (ICD-11).121 
With regard to classifying Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder 
(PCBD) as a separate psychological disorder, the DSM 5 includes it as a 
Condition for Further Study. This section of the DSM 5 proposes potential 
criteria for conditions that require further research before being included as 
a disorder. The proposed criteria are put forward by expert consensus 
based on existing research, and the proposed criteria cannot be used for 
                                                 
117  APA DSM 5 271, 280. 
118  Sadock and Sadock Synopsis of Psychiatry 67. 
119  Duffy and Wild 2017 Cognitive Behaviour Therapist 1-2.  
120  APA DSM 5 289. 
121  Killikelly and Maercker 2017 Eur J Psychotraum 3-4. 
A MUKHEIBIR & G MITCHELL  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  23 
clinical purposes.122 Nonetheless, Persistent Complex Bereavement is 
included as a specifier of an included disorder, namely Other Specified 
Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder123 and the ICD-11 will probably 
include a similar disorder (PGD). Therefore, the proposed criteria of PCBD 
are useful in our distinguishing between normal or complicated 
bereavement responses, and those that could be classified as precipitate or 
perpetuate a distinct psychiatric injury. The proposed condition for further 
study in the DSM 5 known as Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder 
follows what was called "complicated grief" in the DSM IV-TR.  
In distinguishing between PCBD and normal grief, the DSM 5 notes that:124 
… it is only when severe levels of grief response persist at least 12 months 
following the death and interfere with the individual's capacity to function that 
Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder [would be] diagnosed. 
Duration, severity and impairment, therefore, form the basis of a diagnosis 
of PCBD. The proposed criteria of PCBD cover certain domains that will be 
elaborated. 
4.4.1 Closeness of the relationship 
The first proposed diagnostic criterion is that the "individual experienced the 
death of someone with whom he or she had a close relationship".125 It is 
considered a risk factor if the bereaved had a particularly dependent 
relationship on the deceased, or if the deceased was a child.126 
4.4.2 Duration and frequency of severe grief responses 
Grief responses such as a "persistent yearning/longing for the deceased", 
"intense sorrow and emotional pain in response to the death", or 
"preoccupation with the deceased ... [or]… circumstances of the death" 
should be experienced:127 
… on more days than not and to a clinically significant degree and [persist] for 
at least 12 months after the death in the case of bereaved adults and 6 months 
for bereaved children. 
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In addition, at least six symptoms that indicate either "reactive distress to 
the death" and/or "social/identity disruption" should also be:128 
… experienced on more days than not and to a clinically significant degree,  
and have persisted for at least 12 months after the death in the case of 
bereaved adults and 6 months for bereaved children.  
These potential symptoms are enumerated under the two categories, 
namely reactive distress to the death and social/identity disruption. 
4.4.2.1 Reactive distress to the death 
Clinically significant distress as a reaction to the death could manifest in a 
"marked difficulty accepting the death", "experiencing disbelief or emotional 
numbness over the loss", having "difficulty with positive reminiscing about 
the deceased", experiencing "bitterness or anger related to the loss", having 
"maladaptive appraisals about oneself in relation to the deceased or the 
death (e.g., self-blame)", and displaying "excessive avoidance of reminders 
of the loss".129 
4.4.2.2 Social/identity disruption 
Disruption in the social functioning and identity of the bereaved could be 
manifested in a "desire to die in order to be with the deceased", having 
"difficulty trusting other individuals since the death", "feeling alone or 
detached from other individuals since the death, "feeling that life is 
meaningless or empty without the deceased", or having "the belief that one 
cannot function without the deceased", experiencing "confusion about one's 
role in life", or having "a diminished sense of one's identity (e.g., feeling that 
a part of oneself died with the deceased)", or having "difficulty or reluctance 
to pursue interests since the loss or to plan for the future (e.g., friendships, 
activities)".130  
4.4.3 Distress and impairment 
As with all psychiatric conditions, the individual's symptoms need to cause 
"clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning" and the "bereavement reaction [should be] 
out of proportion to or inconsistent with cultural, religious, or age-appropriate 
norms".131 These criteria would become particularly important in the 
                                                 
128  APA DSM 5 789-790. 
129  APA DSM 5 790. 
130  APA DSM 5 789. 
131  APA DSM 5 790. 
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clinicians' judgment in distinguishing between normal grief responses and a 
clinically significant disruption. Exploration of pre-morbid functioning and the 
cultural and religious context of the bereaved would be important in any 
diagnosis.  
Kaplan and Sadock132 suggest that three patterns of complicated grief are 
notable, namely chronic grief, hypertropic grief and delayed grief. Chronic 
grief is "often highlighted by bitterness and idealisation of the dead" and is 
common where the bereaved's relationship with the deceased was 
extremely close or dependent. Hypertropic grief is observed after sudden or 
unexpected deaths, bereavement responses are particularly intense, and 
normal coping or mitigating strategies do not work. Delayed grief is "marked 
by prolonged denial; anger and guilt may complicate its course".133  
4.4.4 Prevalence 
The DSM 5 suggests that approximately 2, 4%-4, 8% of bereaved persons 
would experience PCBD (APA, 2013, 791). The incidence of PCBD as to 
be included in the ICD-11 is estimated to be between 4, 2% and 9, 8%. 
Among those bereaved due to a violent death, the prevalence is much 
higher at between 10% and 15%, and is as high as 14%-74% for those who 
experienced a disaster.134 
These proposed statistics of the prevalence of PCBD in the DSM 5 indicate 
that a small minority of bereaved persons experiences this extraordinary 
form of grief. This provides an important context for the consideration of the 
"floodgate" argument which the present authors will now discuss. 
5  Debunking the "floodgates" argument 
The fear of the "floodgates of liability" being opened in certain situations is 
not new, but it is generally accepted in South African law that the "flood" 
("oewerlose aanspreeklikheid") can be stemmed by the correct application 
of the elements of delict, in particular the elements of wrongfulness and 
legal causation.  
These cases dealt with instances of negligent misrepresentation, but the 
principles are the same; namely, in order to avert the fear of burgeoning 
liability, the elements of delict ought to be used correctly.  
                                                 
132  Sadock and Sadock Synopsis of Psychiatry 65-66. 
133  Sadock and Sadock Synopsis of Psychiatry 66. 
134  Killikelly and Maercker 2017 Eur J Psychotraum 3-4. 
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In International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley,135 Corbett JA, quoting 
Fleming on Torts states the following:136 
As a matter of practical politics, some limitation must be placed upon legal 
responsibility, because the consequences of an act theoretically stretch into 
infinity. There must be a reasonable connection between the harm threatened 
and the harm done. This inquiry, unlike the first, presents a much larger area 
of choice in which legal policy and accepted value judgments must be the final 
arbiter of what balance to strike between the claim to full reparation for the 
loss suffered by an innocent victim of another's culpable conduct and the 
excessive burden that would be imposed on human activity if a wrongdoer 
were held to answer for all the consequences of his default.  
In this regard the Sauls case, dealing with emotional shock and discussed 
above, is relevant.137 The court emphasised the application of the general 
principles of delict in reply to the "floodgate" argument raised by the counsel 
for the defendant:138 
I can find no general, 'public policy' limitation to the claim of a plaintiff, other 
than a correct and careful application of the well-known requirements of 
delictual liability and of the onus of proof. It is not justifiable to limit the sort of 
claim now under consideration, as has been offered as one solution, to a 
defined relationship between the primary and secondary victims, such as 
parent and child, husband and wife, etc. 
The court does not disregard the relationship between the "primary and 
secondary victims"; this is taken into account when considering "legal policy, 
reasonableness, fairness and justice". This would fit within the ambit of the 
test for legal causation as formulated in the International Shipping case, 
namely:139 
… whether the wrongful act is linked sufficiently closely or directly to the loss 
for legal liability to ensue or whether, as it is said, the loss is too remote. This  
is basically a juridical problem in the solution of which considerations of policy 
may play a part … . 
The "proximity" factor discussed in 4.4.1, for example, could be taken into 
account in considering the legal causation question.  
In addition to the elements of wrongfulness and legal causation’s being used 
to curtail limitless liability, the element of harm also limits liability in that a 
plaintiff has to prove damage or harm for a delictual action to ensue. From 
section 4 above, it is clear that drawing a distinction between "bereavement 
                                                 
135  International Shipping Co (Pty) Ptd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) (hereafter the 
International Shipping case). 
136  The International Shipping case para 67. 
137  The Sauls case. 
138  The Sauls case para 17. 
139  International Shipping case 700E. 
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or sadness" on the one hand and psychiatric injury on the other is somewhat 
simplistic. There are conditions that currently do not amount to psychiatric 
injury under consideration for inclusion in the DSM 5, and that will therefore 
fall within the ambit of harm, even though these conditions may currently 
not be recognised. 
In deciding the issue of liability for damages arising from non-patrimonial 
loss, avoiding the "floodgates of liability" entails an exercise in going "back 
to basics", in this case, basics being a correct application of the principles 
of delict.  
However, post 1994 these principles also have to be infused with the values 
underpinning the Constitution and in particular the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. In deciding whether to hold perpetrators 
liable, the courts have to take into account the constitutional imperative to 
develop the common law and in thus doing to promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. Unless and to the extent that a limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, a limitation of liability cannot infringe 
on basic rights such as dignity, equality and the security of the person. This 
has been illustrated very clearly by the Constitutional Court in a number of 
cases where the common law principles of the law of delict were developed 
to ensure liability for perpetrators. In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security140 the Constitutional Court per Ackerman and Goldstone JJ noted 
that the courts a quo had erred in not finding that the defendant's omission 
was wrongful, in that they had applied the pre-constitutional test for 
wrongfulness, thus overlooking the demands of section 39(2).141 Other 
cases that expanded the common law principles include K v Minister of 
Safety and Security142 and F v Minister of Safety and Security143 (vicarious 
liability "course and scope requirement") and Lee v Minister of Correctional 
Services144 (factual causation).  
In Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure 
Development, Gauteng,145 dealing with a case of pure economic loss. 
                                                 
140  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
141  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 37. 
142  K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
143  F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC). 
144  Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 2 SA 144 (CC). 
145  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development,  
Gauteng 2015 1 SA 1 (CC). 
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Khampepe J recognised the fact that the application of the elements of delict 
could be used in limiting liability:146 
So the element of wrongfulness provides the necessary check on liability in 
these circumstances. It functions in this context to curb liability and, in doing 
so, to ensure that unmanageably wide or indeterminate liability does not 
eventuate and that liability is not inappropriately allocated. But it should be 
noted – and this was unfortunately given little attention in argument – that the 
element of causation (particularly legal causation, which is itself based on 
policy considerations) is also a mechanism of control in pure economic loss 
cases that can work in tandem with wrongfulness. 
In H v Fetal Assessment Centre,147 the Constitutional Court had to address 
the issue of limitless liability when dealing with a so-called wrongful life 
claim. Previously these claims were not allowed in South African law.148 The 
Court per Froneman J, affirming the potential existence of an action for 
wrongful life, applied the general principles of the law of delict. The element 
of wrongfulness was used to address the fear of limitless liability.149 The 
court, with reference to Country Cloud, used the element of wrongfulness 
to address the problem of limiting liability. At the same time, the court also 
considered the best interest of the child, in particular Section 28(2) of the 
Bill of Rights, in deciding whether there had been a breach of a legal duty, 
which would be indicative of the wrongfulness of the omission in question.150 
6 Conclusion  
Expanding the limits of delictual liability invariably gives rise to the fear of 
opening the floodgates of liability or the "owerlose aanspreeklikheid". South 
African law has a long history of the limits of the law expanding in a very 
restrained way so as to avoid the opening of the floodgates. The Dutch 
legislature, likewise, wished to avoid the Amerikaanse claimcultuur and 
initially did not recognise sadness or a sense of bereavement without 
psychiatric injury as a ground for damages. After a long journey of almost 
two decades, the Wet Affectieschade came into operation in January 2019, 
making provision for fixed amounts of compensation to a specific list of 
people who suffer this type of loss. The distinction between shockschade 
and affectieschade, therefore, remains. South African law has likewise 
drawn a clear distinction between ordinary sadness or bereavement and 
psychiatric injury. It is clear from research, however, that there is no clear 
                                                 
146  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development,  
Gauteng 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) para 25. 
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dividing line between mere sadness and psychiatric injury, and that the 
courts should recognise that there is a continuum of conditions, and decide 
in each case whether or not the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm. 
The diagnostic criteria of various long recognised and well researched 
psychiatric disorders that could be precipitated, perpetuated or exacerbated 
by a bereavement would be useful in determining a specific psychiatric 
injury. However, the enduring desire of the DSM and the ICD of including 
some continuum of bereavement that is complicated, depending on various 
circumstances and factors, indicates the very seriousness and disruptive 
nature of bereavement in a person's life and functioning. This disruption is 
not always well accommodated by social norms which can place a high and 
possibly unrealistic demand on bereaved persons’ returning to normal social 
and occupational functioning rapidly. Bereavement is a significant and 
distinct area of suffering that exists on a continuum and needs to be 
recognised as a genuine cause of disruption in an individual's social and 
occupational functioning. 
Even in the absence of the safeguards provided by the diagnostic criteria, 
application of the general principles of delict will avert limitless liability. In 
particular, the elements of wrongfulness and legal causation could be used 
effectively in an attempt to curtail limitless liability. The limitation of liability 
can never take place at the expense of the fundamental rights of the victims. 
The dignity of the victims of bereavement and emotional shock requires the 
courts to consider their claims to give effect to the spirit, objects and purport 
of the Bill of Rights. The development of the common law of delict will 
continue to expand the parameters of the law of delict, but not without 
limitation. 
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